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Abstract
What happens when your implementation of SSL or
some other cryptographic protocol is subverted through a
buffer overflow attack? You have been hacked, yes. Un-
fortunately, you may be unaware of it: because normal
traffic is encrypted, most IDSs cannot monitor it. We
propose a simple, yet efficient technique to detect most
of such attacks, by computing the entropy of the flow and
comparing it against known thresholds.
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection is an important theme in practical
computer security. The purpose of this paper is to give a
means of detecting some specific attacks targeted at im-
plementations of security protocols such as SSL [6, 16]
or SSH [38, 39], in general cryptographic protocols.
One might think that nothing differentiates such at-
tacks from the majority of attacks that modern intru-
sion detection systems (IDS) have to detect, even com-
plex ones [25, 30, 9] (most of which based on buffer
overflows). E.g., misuse detection systems can detect
these attacks by monitoring flows of (system, or net-
work) events; anomaly detection systems may detect
these by, say, noting statistical deviations from normal
flows. However, these classical approaches both rest on
the assumption that events can be read at all by the IDS.
The point in attacks such as [16] or [39] is that traffic
is encrypted, so that, under normal working conditions,
the IDS cannot read it.
The purpose of this paper is to describe a technique
that detects such attacks. Our technique is simple, effi-
cient, detects all attacks of this kind without having to
write several intrusion profiles or signatures, and does
not require key escrows [18, Section 13.8.3] of any form.
To make it brief, our technique is based on an en-
tropy estimator. Define the entropy of an N -character
word w over an alphabet ! = {0, 1, . . . ,m ! 1} as
Ĥ(w) = !
∑m!1
i=0 fi log fi, where fi is the frequency of
occurrence of letter i in w, and we take log to denote log-
arithms base 2. This concept, due to C. E. Shannon [28],
conveys the amount of information stored in w, and is
central to physics, coding theory, and statistics [5]. Call
byte entropy the entropy of words over the byte alphabet


















Figure 1: Normal SSL v2 Session
Encrypted traffic is (using state-of-the-art crypto-
graphic algorithms) indistinguishable from random traf-
fic. The byte entropy of a random sequence of charac-
ters is 8 bits per byte, at least in the limit N " +#.
On the other hand, the byte entropy of a non-encrypted
sequence of characters is much lower. According to [5,
Section 6.4], the byte entropy of English text is no greater
than 2.8, and even 0-order approximations do not exceed
4.26.
Let us convey the idea of using byte entropy to de-
tect attacks. For example, the mod_ssl attack [16] uses
a heap overflow vulnerability during the key exchange
(handshake) phase of SSL v2 to execute arbitrary code
on the target machine. A normal (simplified) execution
of this protocol is tentatively pictured in Figure 1. Flow
direction is pictured by arrows, from left (client) to right
(server) or conversely. The order of messages is from top
to bottom. The handshake phase consists of the top six
messages. Encrypted traffic then follows. We have given
an indication of the relative level of entropy by levels of
shading, from light (clear text, low entropy) to dark gray












Figure 2: Hijacked SSL v2 Session
Shell codes that are generally used with the mod_ssl
attack hijack one session, and reuse the https connection
to offer basic terminal facilities to the remote attacker.
We detect this by realizing that the byte entropy of the
flow on this connection, which should quickly approach
8, remains low. See Figure 2 for an illustration of what
this should look like. Note that, since the shell code com-
municates in clear after the key exchange phase, entropy
will be low in the bottom messages. (The last three mes-
sages of the handshake have been skipped by the shell
code. Note that, since they are encrypted, there is no
way to distinguish them from post-handshake encrypted
traffic.) In fact, since the shell code itself, whose entropy
is low, is sent in lieu of a session key, the entropy is al-
ready low in some parts of the key exchange. This can
be used to detect the attack even if the shell code does
not communicate over the https channel, which is also
common.
Just the same method applies to detect the SSH
CRC32 attack [39], or more recent attacks that subvert
traffic that ought to be encrypted, or random, or com-
pressed under normal conditions of use. (See examples
in Section 7.3)
Outline. We start by reviewing related work in Sec-
tion 2. This will be an opportunity for us to review al-
ternate detection mechanisms, and to state the known
limitations of each approach (including ours). We then
introduce the notion of sample entropy and its proper-
ties in Section 3. We show in Section 4 how the sample
entropy can be evaluated, and used to give reliable esti-
mators of whether a given piece of traffic is scrambled
(encrypted, compressed, random) or not. In particular,
we shall see that the sample entropy is capable of esti-
mating this on very short bursts of characters with high
confidence. We briefly review other possible estimators
of disorder in Section 5. In Section 6, we examine how
this can be put to use in detecting attacks, where only
parts of the protocol messages are meant to be scram-
bled, and may be subverted—as in Figure 2. We describe
how we implemented this in the Net-Entropy sensor, see
Section 7. Finally, we conclude in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Entropy and sample entropy have been standard notions
in statistics since the pioneering work of C. E. Shan-
non [28]. They have been used in countless works. We
shall review related work on sample entropy and entropy
estimators, as needed, in the next section, where we re-
view basic notions and some required mathematical re-
sults.
In security, the idea of using the sample entropy to
collect some statistical information about a network has
already been used, e.g., in [10]. However, our purpose
is different. We do not attempt to detect information
about a network (e.g., detecting what a user types from
timing delays between keystrokes over SSH [29]), rather
we wish to detect typical attacker behavior. The entropy
of data has already been used as heuristic in virus and
malware detection: most of common binary executable
files have an average entropy around 6.5 (depending of
the compiler, processor architecture, operating system,
binary file format). Malicious software executables are
usually packed, compressed and/or encrypted. This op-
eration increases the entropy of files. An entropy analy-
sis phase is included in the PEiD tool [12]. Data entropy
has also been included into file system forensic analy-
sis tools such as WinHex Forensic [37], which need to
guess the type of files on given file systems (low entropy
files are text, XML, mails, binary files; high entropy files
are multimedia, compressed, encrypted files). Our focus
is different, and the idea of detecting subverted crypto-
graphic protocols, i.e., instances where scrambled flow
is expected but clear text is found, is new. We shall see
that some of the problems that crop up in this setting re-
quire new solutions, e.g., see Section 6.
There is also abundant literature on formal verifica-
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tion of cryptographic protocols (see e.g. [11] for an entry
point). These works are concerned with verifying certain
properties such as secrecy, or authentication on idealized
models of communication. Our point here is to analyze
actual network flows. In particular, we consider distribu-
tions of characters in these flows, which is out of reach
of the aforementioned methods.
Next, let us investigate what other methods are avail-
able to detect subverted cryptographic protocols, and in
general how attacks such as [16] or [39] can be detected
today.
Snort [26] detects these attacks by comparing all flows
against signatures for known shellcodes and traffic they
generate. This is reasonable, because shellcodes will ap-
pear in clear during the attack phase, and because only a
few dozen standard shellcodes are routinely used in cur-
rent exploits. (This is very similar to virus detection.)
It therefore suffices to list a few characteristic byte se-
quences, corresponding to each particular shellcode. One
problem with this approach is that the signature base has
to be maintained, and enriched each time a new shellcode
or attack appears on the hacking scene.
Our approach, on the contrary, applies independently
of the actual shellcode used, and applies to zero-day at-
tacks. This is also the case for PAYL [33], where worms
are detected by evaluating a so-called Manhattan dis-
tance between reference one-character distributions and
observed traffic. Other possible distances include the
Mahanobis distance [34]. One could also argue for the
Kullback-Leibler distance [5], which in general lends it-
self to more rigorous mathematical argumentation. Our
use of the sample entropy can be seen as a special case of
this distance, where the reference distribution is uniform.
Naturally, there is no silver bullet, and every detection
technique can be countered. To counter ours, it would
suffice for an attacker to use a relatively small shellcode
that encrypts its own communication, or even does not
communicate at all on the monitored ports, and whose
binary code is itself scrambled (i.e., encrypted, or com-
pressed, namely whose binary code achieves a high en-
tropy). Technology to scramble binary code can be taken
from the world of encrypted, polymorphic, or metamor-
phic viruses [31]. It is therefore possible to defeat our
mechanism—at least in principle; we shall see in Sec-
tion 4.2 that our mechanism is so sensitive that it is in
fact able to tell polymorphic shellcodes apart from en-
crypted traffic.
Another countermeasure against cryptographic proto-
col subversion is to check that all key exchanges are
properly formatted. E.g., in the mod_ssl attack [16],
the ClientMasterKey message (3rd message in the
handshake) will hold a key_arg field of the wrong size.
If the intruder detection system is able to monitor each
protocol, and recompute all sizes on the fly, this would be
a way of detecting these attacks. This is rather complex,
and we shall argue against it in Section 6.1. Computing
entropies is also much simpler.
3 Sample Entropy and Estimators
First, a note on notation. Recall that we take log to de-
note base 2 logarithms. Entropies will be computed us-
ing log, and will be measured in bits. The notation ln
is reserved to natural logarithms. Some papers we shall
refer to use natural logarithms. We shall then adapt their
results without mentioning it explicitly; this will usually
involve introducing a factor 1/ ln 2 = log e $ 1.4427.
Let w be a word of length N , over an alphabet ! =
{0, 1, . . . ,m ! 1}. We may count the number ni of oc-
currences of each letter i % !. The frequency fi of i in
w is then ni/N . The sample entropy of w is:




(The superscript MLE is for maximum likelihood esti-
mator.) If w is a random word over !, where each char-
acter is drawn uniformly and independently, the frequen-
cies fi will tend to 1/m in probability as N tends to in-
finity, by the law of large numbers.
The formula is close enough to the notion of entropy
of a random source, but the two should not be confused.
Given a probability distribution p = (pi)i"! over !, the





In the case where each character is drawn uniformly and
independently, pi = 1/m for every i, and H(p) = log m.
It is hard not to confuse H and ĤMLEN , in particular
because a property known as the asymptotic equiparti-
tion property (AEP, [5, Chapter 3]) states that, indeed,
ĤMLEN (w) converges in probability to H(p) when the
length N of w tends to +#, as soon as each character of
w is drawn independently according to the distribution
p. In the case of the uniform distribution, this means that
ĤMLEN (w) tends to log m. When characters are bytes,
m = 256, so ĤMLEN (w) tends to 8 (bits per byte).
Before we continue, note that the approximation
ĤMLEN (w) $ H(p) is valid when N & m.
However, we are not interested in the limit of
ĤMLEN (w) when N tends to infinity. There are several
reasons for this. First, actual messages we have to mon-
itor may be of bounded length. E.g., the encrypted pay-
load may be only a few dozen bytes long (N ' 100,
whereas m = 256) in short-lived SSH connections. Sec-
ond, even though we may count on N being large for
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some encrypted connections, we have to decide at some
time point whether traffic is scrambled or not: we use
a cutoff, typically N ' 216 = 65 536, and will only
compute the entropy of the first 65 536 bytes of traffic.
Third, it is important to detect intrusions at the earliest
time possible. If we can detect unscrambled traffic after

























Figure 3: Average Sample Entropy ĤMLEN (w) of Words
w of Size N
Let us plot the average ĤMLEN of Ĥ
MLE
N (w) when w
is drawn uniformly among words of size N , for m =
256, and N ranging from 1 to 65 536 (Figure 3). Please
note that the x-axis has logarithmic, not linear scale.
(ĤMLEN was evaluated by sampling over words gener-
ated using the /dev/urandom source.) The value of
H(p) is shown as the horizontal line y = 8. As the-
ory predicts, when N & m, typically when N is of
the order of roughly at least 10 times as large as m,
then ĤMLEN $ H(p). On the other hand, when N is
small (roughly at least 10 times as small as m), then
ĤMLEN $ log N . Considering the orders of magnitude
of N and m cited above, clearly we are interested in the
regions where N $ m. . . precisely where ĤMLEN is far
from H(p).
At this point, let us ask ourselves what the state of the
art is in this domain. The field of research most con-
nected to this work is called entropy estimation [2], and
the fact that N $ m or N < m is often characterized as
the fact that the probability p is undersampled. In classi-
cal statistics, our problem is often described as follows.
Take objects that can be classified into m bins (our bins
are just bytes) according to some probability distribution
p. Now take N samples, and try to decide whether the
entropy of p is log m (or, in general, the entropy of a
given, fixed probability distribution) just by looking at
the samples. The papers [1, 23, 24] are particularly rele-
vant to our work, since they attempt to achieve this pre-
cisely when the probability is undersampled, as in our
case.
The problem that Paninski tries to solve [23, 24] is
finding an estimator ĤN of H(p), that is, a statis-
tical quantity, computed over randomly generated N -
character words, which gives some information about the
value of H(p). Particularly interesting estimators are the
unbiased estimators, that is those such that E(ĤN ) =
H(p), where E denotes mathematical expectation (i.e.,
the average of all ĤN (w) over all N -character words w).
If we have an unbiased estimator ĤN of H(p), then
our detection problem is easy: compute ĤN over the
N -character input word w, then if ĤN (w) = 8 up to
some small tolerance ! > 0, then w is random enough
(hence almost certainly scrambled), otherwise w is un-
scrambled. Because we reason up to !, we may even
tolerate a small bias; the bias of ĤN is E(ĤN )!H(p).
The sample entropy ĤMLEN , introduced above, is an
estimator, sometimes called the plug-in estimate, or max-
imum likelihood estimator [23]. As Figure 3 demon-
strates, it is biased, and the bias can in fact be rather large.
So ĤMLEN does not fit our requirements for ĤN .
Let us say right away that, while the limit N " +#
of the estimator ĤMLEN is unbiased, a surprising result
due to Antos and Kontoyiannis is that the error between
an estimator of H(p) and H(p) converges to 0 arbitrarily
slowly, when p is arbitrary: see [1, Theorem 4], or [23,
Section 3.2]. In a sense, this means that finding an unbi-
ased estimator of the actual entropy of the flow is diffi-
cult. However, our problem is less demanding: we only
want to distinguish this actual entropy from the entropy
































Figure 4: Sample Entropy Estimators
Comparing ĤMLEN to the entropy at the limit, log m,
is wrong, because ĤMLEN is biased for any fixed N .
Nonetheless, we may introduce a correction to the es-
timator ĤMLEN . To this end, we must estimate the bias.
Historically, the first estimation of the bias is the Miller-
Madow bias correction [19] (m̂ ! 1)/(2N ln 2), where
m̂ = |{i|fi (= 0}| is the number of characters that do
appear at all in our N -character string w, yielding the
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Miller-Madow estimator:








fi log fi +
m̂! 1
2N ln 2
Another one is the jackknifed MLE [8]:








where w!j denotes the (N !1)-character word obtained
from w by removing the jth character. While all these
corrected estimators indeed correct the 1/N term from
biases at the limit N " +#, they are still far from being
unbiased when N is small: see Figure 4.
In the case that interests us here, i.e., when p if the
uniform distribution over m characters, an exact asymp-
totic formula for the bias is known as a function of c > 0
when N and m both tend to infinity and N/m tends to c
[23, Theorem 3]. (See also Appendix A.) The corrected
estimator is:
ĤPN (w) = Ĥ
MLE





(j ! 1)! log j
While the formula is exact only when N and m both
grow to infinity, in practice m = 256 is large enough
for this formula to be relevant. On our experiments, the
difference between the average of ĤPN (w) over random
experiments and log m = 8 is between !0.0002 and
0.0051 for N ' 100 000, and tends to 0 as N tends
to infinity. (On Figure 4, it is impossible to distinguish
ĤPN —the “Paninski” curve—from 8.) We can in partic-
ular estimate that ĤPN is a reasonably unbiased estimator
of H(p), when p is the uniform distribution.
4 Evaluating the Average Sample Entropy
Instead of trying to compute a correct estimator of the
actual entropy H(p), which is, as we have seen, a rather
difficult problem, we turn the problem around.
Let HN (p) be the N -truncated entropy of the distri-
bution p = (pi)i"!. This is defined as the average of the
sample entropy ĤMLEN (w) over all words w of length N ,
drawn at random according to p. In other words, this is
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n0! . . . nm!1!
is the multinomial coefficient.
When p is the uniform distribution U (where pi =





















By construction, ĤMLEN is then an unbiased estimator
of HN . Our strategy to detect unscrambled text is then
to take the flow w, of length N , to compute ĤMLEN (w),
and to compare it to HN (U). If the two quantities are
significantly apart, then w is not random. Otherwise, we
may assume that w looks random enough so that w is
likely to be scrambled.
Not only is this easier to achieve than estimating the
actual entropy H(p), we shall see (Section 4.2) that this
provides us much narrower confidence intervals, that is,
much more precise estimates of non-randomness.
For example, if w is the word
0x55 0x89 0xe5 0x83 0xec 0x58 0x83 0xe4
0xf0 0xb8 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x29 0xc4
0xc7 0x45 0xf4 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x83
0xec 0x04 0xff 0x35 0x60 0x99 0x04 0x08
of length N = 32 (which is much less than m = 256),
then ĤMLEN (w) = 3.97641, while HN (U) = 4.87816,
to 5 decimal places. Since 3.97641 is significantly
less than 4.87816 (about 1 bit less information), one is
tempted to conclude that w above is not scrambled. (This
is indeed true: this w is the first 32 bytes of the code of
the main() function of an ELF executable, compiled
under gcc. However, we cannot yet conclude, until we
compute confidence intervals, see Section 4.2.)
Consider, on the other hand, the word
0x85 0x01 0x0e 0x03 0xe9 0x48 0x33 0xdf
0xb8 0xad 0x52 0x64 0x10 0x03 0xfe 0x21
0xb0 0xdd 0x30 0xeb 0x5c 0x1b 0x25 0xe7
0x35 0x4e 0x05 0x11 0xc7 0x24 0x88 0x4a
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This has sample entropy ĤN (w) = 4.93750. This is
close enough to HN (U) = 4.87816 that we may want to
conclude that this w is close to random. And indeed, this
w is the first 32 bytes of a text message encrypted with
gpg. Comparatively, the entropy of the first 32 bytes of
the corresponding plaintext is only 3.96814.
Note that, provided a deviation of roughly 1 bit from
the predicted value HN (U) is significant, the ĤMLEN
estimator allows us to detect deviations from random-
looking messages extremely quickly: using just 32 char-
acters in the examples above. Actual message sizes in
SSL or SSH are of the order of a few kilobytes.
4.1 Computing HN(U)
There are basically three ways to compute HN (U). (Re-
call that we need this quantity to compare ĤMLEN (w) to.)
The first is to use Equation (2). However, this quickly
becomes unmanageable as m and N grow. Indeed, the
outer summation is taken over all m-tuples of integers





m = 2, this would be an easy sum of N + 1 terms. For
m = 256, this would mean summing O(N255) terms.
E.g., for a 1 kilobyte message (N = 1 024), this would



























Data size (in Byte)
Figure 5: Error Term in (3)
A much better solution is to recall Equation (1). An-
other way of reading it is to say that, for each constant c,
when N and m tend to infinity in such a way that N/m
is about c, then
HN (U) = log m (3)




(j ! 1)! log j + o(1)
As we have seen, when m = 256, this approxima-
tion should give a good approximation of HN (U). In
fact, this approximation is surprisingly close to the ac-




















Figure 6: Number of Iterations to Convergence (96-Bit
Floats)
Figure 5. It is never more than 0.004 bit, and decreases
quickly as N grows.
The above series converges quickly. The series is a
sum of positive numbers, so that rounding errors tend
not to accumulate. We have implemented this series us-
ing 96-bit IEEE floating-point numbers, by summing all
terms until the sum stabilizes (i.e., until the next term
is negligible compared to the current partial sum, yield-
ing results precise to about 51–63 bits of mantissa). The
number of iterations needed is roughly linear in c, see
Figure 6. Note that we have gone as far as c = 4 000,
corresponding to N = 1 024 000. This would only be
needed for connections lasting for about 1 Mb. In prac-
tice, with a cutoff of 64 Kb, we never need more than


















Figure 7: Number of Iterations to Convergence (96-Bit
Floats)
On a 1.6 GHz Pentium-M laptop, computing all values
of this function from 0.001 to 128 by steps of 0.001 takes
2.65 s., i.e., each computation of the series takes 21µs.
on average. (Recall that we compute this series up to
roughly 51 bits, i.e., 18 decimal digits, although we only
really need 4 or 5 digits.) Depending on the context, this
may be fast enough or not. If this is not fast enough,
tabulating all the values of the function from 1/256 $
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0.004 to 128 by steps of 0.004 requires us to store 384Kb
of data, using 96 bit floats, or just 128Kb using 32 bit
floats (which is enough for the precision we need).
The third method to evaluate HN (U) is the stan-
dard Monte-Carlo method consisting in drawing enough
words w of length N at random, and taking the average
of ĤN (w) over all these words w. This is how we eval-
uated HN (U) in Figure 3, and how we defined the refer-
ence value of HN (U) which we compared to (3) in Fig-
ure 5. To be precise, we took the average over 100 000
samples for N < 65 536, taking all values of N below
16, taken one value in 2 below 32, one value in 4 be-
low 64, . . . , and one value in 4 096 below 65 536. The
spikes are statistical variations that one may attribute to
randomness in the source. Note that they are in general
smaller than the error term o(1) in (3).
We can then compute HN (U) by this Monte-Carlo
method, and fill in tables with all required values of
HN (U) (note that m is fixed). While this is likely to use
only about 128Kb already, we can save some memory by
exploiting the fact that HN (U) is a smooth and increas-
ing [23, Proposition 3] function of c, by only storing a
few well-chosen points and extrapolating; and by using
the fact that values of c that are not multiples of 4/256 or
even 8/256 are hardly ever needed.
In the sequel, and in particular in Section 6, we shall
need to evaluate more complicated functions, notably
functions of which we know no asymptotic approxima-
tion such as (3). We shall always compute them by look-
ing up tables, filled in by such Monte-Carlo methods.
4.2 Confidence Intervals
Evaluating ĤMLEN (w) only gives a statistical indication
of how close we are to HN (U). Recall our first exam-
ple, where w was the first 32 bytes of the code of the
main() function of some ELF executable. We found
ĤMLEN (w) = 3.97641, while HN (U) = 4.87816. What
is the actual probability that w of length N = 32 is un-
scrambled when ĤMLEN (w) = 3.97641 and HN (U) =
4.87816?
It is again time to turn to the literature. Ac-
cording to [1, Section 4.1], when N tends to +#,
ĤMLEN is asymptotically Gaussian, in the sense that*
N ln 2(ĤMLEN ! H) tends to a Gaussian distribution
with mean 0 and variance "2N = V ar{! log p(X)}. In
non-degenerate cases (i.e., when "2N > 0), the expecta-
tion of (ĤMLEN ! H)2 is "(1/N). . . but precisely, the
p = U case is degenerate.
As we have already said, our interest is not in the limit
of large values of N . Unfortunately, much less is known
about the variance of ĤMLEN = ĤMLEN when N $ m
or N < m than about its bias. One useful inequality is
that the variance of ĤMLEN is bounded from above by





























































Figure 9: Standard Deviation of ĤMLEN (w), in Log
Scale
On the other hand, we may estimate the standard
deviation of ĤN by a Monte-Carlo method, estimat-
ing the statistical standard deviation SD(ĤMLEN ) of
ĤMLEN (w), on random words w of length N . The re-
sult is shown as the thick curve in Figure 8. It turns out
that SD(ĤMLEN ) evolves as 16.29/N when N " +#,
as Figure 9 (y-axis in logarithmic scale) makes clear.





ln 2 : as predicted
by [20, Equation (12)], the variance of ĤMLEN evolves
as "2N +
m!1
2N2 ln2 2 when N " +#, and in our case
"2N = 0, as we have seen. SD(ĤMLEN ) reaches its max-
imum (about 0.08 bit) for N of the order of 16, while for
N + m the standard deviation is so close to 16.29/N
that we can equate the two for all practical purposes.
In particular, for typical packet sizes of 1, 2, 4, and 8
Kb, the standard deviation SD(ĤMLEN ) is 0.016, 0.008,
0.004, and 0.002 bit respectively. This is small.
Then, we can also estimate percentiles, again by
a Monte-Carlo method, see Figure 10: the y values
are given so that a proportion of all words w tested


































ĤMLEN . The proportions go from 50% (bottom) to
99.9% (top). Note that, unless N ' 16 (which is unre-
alistic), our estimate of ĤMLEN is exact with an error of
at most 4SD(ĤMLEN ), with probability 99.9%, and that
4SD(ĤN ) is at most 64/N , and in any case no larger
than 0.32 bit (for words of about 16 characters).
Let’s return to our introductory question: What is
the actual probability that w of length N = 32 is un-
scrambled when ĤMLEN (w) = 3.97641 and HN (U) =
4.87816? For N = 32, SD(ĤMLEN ) is about maximal,
and equal to 0.081156. So we are at least 99.9% sure that
the entropy of a 32-byte word with characters drawn uni-
formly is 4.87816±4)0.081156, i.e., between 4.55353
and 5.20279: if ĤMLEN (w) = 3.97641, we can safely
bet that w is not scrambled. Note that N = 32 is almost
the worst possible case we could dream of. Still, ĤMLEN
is already a reliable estimator of randomness here.
For packets of sizes 1, 2, 4, and 8 Kb, and a confidence
level of 99.9% again, ĤMLEN is precise up to ±0.0625,




Binary executable (elf-i386) 6.35 8.00
Shell scripts 5.54 8.00
Terminal activity 4.98 8.00
1 Gbyte e-mail 6.12 8.00
1Kb X.509 certificate (PEM) 5.81 7.80 ± 0.061
700b X.509 certificate (DER) 6.89 7.70 ± 0.089
130b bind shellcode 5.07 6.56 ± 0.24
38b standard shellcode 4.78 5.10 ± 0.28
73b polymorphic shellcode 5.69 5.92 ± 0.27
Random 1 byte NOPs (i386) 5.71 7.99
Figure 11: Sample Entropy of Some Common Non-
Random Sources
We report some practical experiments in Figure 11,
on non-cryptographic sources. This gives an idea of the
amount of redundancy in common data sources. The
entropy of binary executables (ELF format, i386 archi-
tecture) was evaluated under Linux and FreeBSD by
collecting all .text sections of all files in /bin and
/usr/bin. Similarly, the entropy of shell scripts was
computed by collecting all shell scripts on the root vol-
ume of Linux and FreeBSD machines (detected by the
file command). Terminal activity was collected by
monitoring a dozen telnet connections (port 23) on
tcp from a given machine with various activity, such as
text editing, manual reading, program compilation and
execution (about 1 Mb of data). As far as e-mail is con-
cerned, the measured entropy corresponds to 3 years of
e-mail on the first author’s account. These correspond
to large volumes of data (large N ), so that HN is 8 to 2
decimal places, and confidence intervals are ridiculously
small.
The next experiments were made on smaller pieces of
data. Accordingly, we have given HN in the form H±#,
where # is the 99.9% confidence interval. Note that
X.509 certificates are definitely classified as unscram-
bled. We have also tested a few shellcodes, because,
first, as we have seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, it is in-
teresting to detect when some scrambled piece of data
is replaced by a shellcode, and second, because detect-
ing shellcodes this way is challenging. Indeed, shell-
codes are typically short, so that HN is significantly dif-
ferent from 8. More importantly, modern polymorphic
and metamorphic virus technologies, adapted to shell-
codes, make them look more scrambled. (In fact, the
one we use is encrypted, except for a very short pro-
log.) While the first two shellcodes in Figure 11 are
correctly classified as unscrambled (even a very short
38 byte non-polymorphic shellcode), the last, polymor-
phic shellcode is harder to detect. The 99.9% confidence
interval for being scrambled is [5.65, 6.19]: the sample
entropy of the 73 byte polymorphic shellcode is at the
left end of this interval. The 99% confidence interval
is 5.92 ± 0.19, i.e., [5.73, 6.11]: with 99% confidence,
this shellcode is correctly classified as non-scrambled. In
practice, shellcodes are usually preceded with padding,
typically long sequences of the letter A or the hexadec-
imal value 0x90 (the No-OPeration i386 instruction),
which makes the entropy decrease drastically, so the ex-
amples above are a worst-case scenario. Detecting that
the random key-arg field of Figure 1 was replaced by
a shellcode in Figure 2 is therefore feasible.
Another worst-case scenario in polymorphic viruses
and shellcodes is given by mutation, whereby some spe-
cific instructions, such as nop, are replaced with other
instructions with the same effect, at random. This fools
pattern-matching detection engines, and also increases
entropy. However, as the last line shows on a large
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amount of random substitutes for nop on the i386 ar-
chitecture, this makes the sample entropy culminate at a
rather low value compared to 8.
We conclude this section by noting that ĤMLEN is a re-
markably precise estimator of HN (U), even in very un-
dersampled cases.
5 Other Estimators of Randomness
We have chosen to estimate the entropy H(p) of an un-
known distribution p to detect whether p is close to the
uniform distribution or not. While this works well in
practice, there are other ways to evaluate randomness:
see [13, Section 3.3], or [21].
For example, we may check that the mean
∑m!1
i=0 ifi
is close to (m ! 1)/2. (Recall that fi = ni/N is the











(when pi = 1/m is the uniform distribution U) is not too
large. Recall [13, Section 3.3.1.C] that, in the limit N "
+#, the probability that V̂N (w) ' v, for any v > 0,
tends to the $2 function with m! 1 degrees of freedom.
It is also well-known that, in this case, and letting % =
m! 1, then V̂N (w) is less than % +
*
2%x! + 2/3x2! !
2/3 + O(1/
*
%) with probability &, where x! = 1.64
for & = 0.95, say, and m > 30 [13, Section 3.3.1.A]. Let
us just note that V̂N (w) should be of the order of m ! 1
when p = U , and N " +#.
One may think of computing all, or at least some of
these quantities, to get an improved test of randomness.
However, here is an informal argument that suggests that
this would be pointless. To simplify things, assume that
N is large (recall that the $2 approximation is only valid
for large N ).
If the sample entropy Ĥ(w) is close to its maximum
value log m (when p = U), it is known that the frequen-
cies fi are close to 1/m, say fi = 1/m + #i. Since the
derivative of!x log x is! log x!1/ ln 2, and its second
derivative is !1/(x ln 2), we may approximate Ĥ(w) by
Ĥ(w) = log m +
m!1∑
i=0













The first sum vanishes, since
∑m!1
i=0 #i = 0. So















Ĥ(w)! log m = ! 1
2N ln 2






With probability & = 0.95, V̂N (w) will be of the order of
% = m! 1, and we retrieve a form of the Miller-Madow
estimator: Ĥ(w)!log m is roughly!(m!1)/(2N ln 2)
when p = U . In other words, a $2 test essentially
amounts to estimating the Miller-Madow bias correction,
and checking that it is small. This is only valid in the
limit N " +#, and we estimated the bias much more
precisely in Section 3 anyway.
We also note that Fu et al. [10] compared empirically
the sample mean, sample variance, and sample entropy
as indicators of randomness, and observed that of the
three, sample entropy was the most robust, i.e., the least
sensitive to noise.
There are many other statistical tests. One weakness
of tests based on sample entropy is that ĤN (w) depends
only on the frequencies fi. Any permutation of the let-
ters in w would give rise to the same sample entropy. In
particular, ĤN (w) is unable to note the difference be-
tween the regular sequence of letters 0, 1, . . . , m ! 1,
0, 1, . . . , m ! 1, 0, . . . , and a truly random one. (To be
fair, it will detect a difference for small N , where ĤN
will rise more slowly on the regular sequence.) Testing
the average, or a $2 statistic, suffers from the same prob-
lem. Some other tests, such as the serial test or the gap
test [13, Section 3.3.2], or Maurer’s universal statistical
test [14], or compression tests [5, Chapter 5], do not, and
are able to detect correlations between letters. The de-
fect that most of them share is that they require large
data volumes, i.e., large values of N , to be significant.
In fact, variants of the entropy test also do detect corre-
lations between letters, as first shown by Shannon [28]:
just compute the entropy of digraphs (pairs of letters at
positions i, i + 1), trigraphs (letters at positions i, i + 1,
i + 2), for example.
We have chosen not to investigate this. While this in-
deed improves our estimate of randomness, the simple
sample byte entropy ĤN (w), with m = 256, was enough
in practice. Furthermore, computing the latter can be
done by maintaining an array of 256 values of !fi log fi
over each connection. This is relatively straightforward
to implement, and uses small computing resources. On
the other hand, computing the entropy of digraphs re-
quires up to 65 536 entries per array, which may clog
the machine. It is imaginable that computing the entropy
of consecutive nibble pairs would offer some advantage
here. (A nibble is a half-byte; and no, the entropy of nib-
ble digraphs is not the same as the byte entropy, because
of byte-straddling pairs of nibbles).
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6 Taking into Account Unscrambled Sec-
tions
Until now, we have explored a sweetened situation,
where we had one word (a packet, a flow of charac-
ters during a connection, say), and we wanted to decide
whether it was scrambled or not, as a whole. Referring
to our coloring conventions of Figure 1 and Figure 2, this
allows us to detect whether observed traffic is all dark
gray, or contains enough light gray spots.
However, as we can see on Figure 1—and although
colors were exaggerated—, some sections of the ob-
served traffic have to be light gray. In typical crypto-
graphic protocols, at least some of the first messages ex-
changed are in clear, and not random. We should not
conclude that an attack is in progress here.
Moreover, some specific protocols insert a more or
less important bias. The ideal case of a cryptographic
protocol over TCP would exhibit only encrypted traffic.
This is what SSH2 does, for example. Other protocols
add some control information in clear to encrypted pack-
ets. This adds a bias to the entropy estimator, which
may or may not be negligible. A case in point is the
binary packet format for SSH1 (seen at the TCP level),
which starts with the packet length in clear (4 bytes),
then contains 1 through 8 padding bytes (usually pseudo-
random), and finally the encrypted SSH1 packet. The
most significant bytes of the 4-byte packet length field
will be zero most of the time. (In practice, TCP pack-
ets are no longer than a few kilobytes.) Over a full SSH1
connection spanning several TCP packets, the sample en-
tropy will therefore tend to a value smaller than 8, de-
pending on distribution of packet lengths. In our expe-
rience, we routinely observed limiting values of around
7.95: see Figure 12, in particular the two SSH1 curves.
One particular concern is that this bias is in effect con-
trolled by the untrusted client user, who may force the
SSH1 client to send identical-sized packets: it suffices
for the client to send the same message over and over,
e.g., using a shell script. The extreme case is that of a
client typing an e-mail message, where each typed letter
gives rise to a 1-byte packet, followed by an echo 1-byte
packet.
The same problem occurs in the TLS protocol: each
TLS record begins with a content type identifier (1 byte,
0x17 for application data, 0x15 for alerts, etc.), the ver-
sion of the protocol (two fixed bytes, 0x0301 in the case
of TLS 1.0), the record length (2 bytes), and finally the
encrypted payload.
The above examples show that entropy may be lower
than expected. In other cases, the entropy can also be
higher than expected. A typical example is when coun-
ters or sequence numbers are encountered in clear, which
re-increases entropy, compared to constant data such as
version numbers or type identifiers.
This incurs two problems. First, we should use the
ĤMLEN estimator to detect whether some specific, not
all, sections of traffic are scrambled (dark gray, high en-
tropy). These specific sections are dependent on the pro-
tocol used. If some of these specific sections has low
entropy (light gray), an alert is reported. To this end, we
may track connections, and compute the sample entropy
of various sections of traffic, depending on the port on
which communication takes place (e.g., 443 for https).
We explore how this can be done for known protocols,
such as SSL, in Section 6.1. We shall see that this ap-
proach is unrealistic. We describe simpler and more re-
alistic approaches in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3.
The second problem is that the intuition of coloring
that we used in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is meaningless,
at least formally. There is no such thing as the sample
entropy at a given byte in the flow. The concept of en-
tropy only makes sense on words (or subwords) of suf-
ficient length. Fortunately, as we have seen in previous
sections, we only need to explore rather short subwords
to get a reliable enough estimate of scrambledness.
6.1 Known Protocols
For well-known cryptographic protocols such as SSH
(port 22), or SSL—including https (port 443), nntps
(563), ldaps (636), telnets (992), imaps (993),
ircs (994), pop3s (995), smtps (465)—, it is fea-
sible to document which parts of traffic should have high
entropy.
Most if not all of these protocols start with a key ex-
change, or handshake, phase, usually followed by en-
crypted traffic. The most critical sections are found in
this initial handshake phase. Once keys have been es-
tablished, there is no practical way to break the protocol.
(We do not consider attacks which use the protocol with-
out breaking it, such as the SUN login-over-SSH buffer
overflow exploit [7].) It seems therefore particularly im-
portant that sample entropies are estimated precisely dur-
ing the handshake phase.
If all sections are of fixed size, this is easy to do. E.g.,
on the example of Figure 1, compute ĤMLEN (w) on the
topmost dark subword NC of the ClientHello mes-
sage (NC is 16 bytes long, about the worst-case as far
as confidence intervals are concerned, but as we have
seen, sample entropy can already be estimated accu-
rately in this case); then compute it on the light-and-dark
certificate subword of the ServerHello mes-
sage when it arrives, and so on. Provided that these sub-
words are large enough, this will provide us a reliable
estimate whether these sections are scrambled or not.
Note that the certificate subword is not uni-
formly light or dark. This is because this is an X.509
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certificate, with some data in clear (light), and some en-
crypted signatures (dark). We should therefore also parse
X.509 certificates, and only compare the entropy of those
parts of the certificate that contain scrambled data (typi-
cally signatures).
In general, however, sections are of varying sizes. For
example, in SSL versions 2 and up, key sizes are them-
selves subject to negociation between client and server
during the handshake phase. Some fields are optional:
in the ClientHello message of Figure 1, an optional
session ID field can be inserted before the NC field in
case of session resumption. X.509 certificates may have
varying sizes, depending on the number of fields filled
in, on the sizes of clear text descriptions of issuers, cer-
tificate authorities, etc.
In other words, to implement this solution, we need
to implement a full parser for the protocol at hand (e.g.,
SSL), together with parsers for X.509 certificates and
other fields of varying size and structure. This is done
anyway in products such as Ethereal [4]. The only sim-
ple way we know of doing this is to include standard code
that does it. E.g., in the SSL case, we may just import
relevant code from the OpenSSL project [22]. But the
complete implementation of a new protocol parser may
introduce more security flaws than using an already ma-
ture library. A vivid illustration of this principle was re-
cently produced when it was discovered that the Snort
intrusion detection system [26] was remotely vulnerable
through its Back Orifice protocol parser [17].
In general, the approach sketched here, of embedding
a full parser for the protocols at hand, has a major draw-
back: any buffer overflow attack on the original library
(e.g., OpenSSL) will be present in the entropy monitor-
ing tool. . . and will be triggered in exactly the same
situations. The need for maintaining code as standards
evolve is also a drawback of this approach.
We must therefore conclude that the approach of pars-
ing known protocols completely is unrealistic.
6.2 Aggregating Fields
Instead, we shall aggregate fields, or even whole mes-
sages. In other words, we shall compute the sample en-
tropy of fields or messages as a whole. For example, the
X.509 certificate of the ServerHello message of Fig-
ure 1 is expected to have an overall entropy of roughly
6.89, according to Figure 11.
Naturally, aggregating fields means that confidence in-
tervals must be made wider. In the current state of the art,
it seems that no mathematical theory is available to pre-
dict the actual mean and variance of ĤMLEN on whole
fields or messages, similarly to the results of previous
sections. We shall however give an idea how ĤMLEN
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Figure 13: Entropy of SSL traffic
in the next section.
6.3 Bumps
To give an idea how ĤMLEN evolves when several fields
of different entropies are concatenated, we illustrate this
on random messages of length N , with a prefix of length
N1 generated using a low entropy source, say of entropy
H1; followed by a high-entropy suffix, say with source
entropy equal to H2. Actual messages naturally exhibit
a more complex mix of zones, but our point here is to
make clearer what curves should be expected on simple
examples.
Asymptotic formulae for this case are not too hard to
obtain, but are rather obscure. Making statistical exper-
iments and plotting the resulting curves is far more in-
structive. We plotted ĤMLEN for varying values of N
from 0 to 65 535, and for varying values of N1 (32, 64,
256, 1 024, 4 096, and 16 384) in Figure 14. This rep-
resents what should be expected from messages with a
Base64 encoded prefix of length N1 followed by a se-
quence of scrambled bytes.
While we only see the low-entropy prefix, i.e., for the
first N1 bytes, the sample entropy follows the usual curve
for ĤMLEN1 , which we have already discussed at length,




























Figure 14: Switching From Random Base64 to Random
Characters
our experiment). After the N1 first characters, we see a
sharp increase in entropy, connecting the first curve to a
similar-shaped curve whose new limit is H2 (8 bits in our
experiment).
It is only to be expected that any switch from one field
to another field of differing entropies will then be observ-
able as a sharp turn in direction, either upwards (going
to a higher-entropy field) or downwards (exiting a high-
entropy field).
More interesting is the standard deviation obtained this
way. This is plotted in Figure 15, together with two ref-
erence straight lines. The 16.29/N line is the asymptotic
standard deviation for the sample entropy of the high-
entropy source. The standard deviation for the low en-
tropy source would be aligned on a lower line, of y-value





ln 2 N ; for
Base64 encoding, m $ 6, yielding 8.10/N .) This fig-
ure reads as follows. While we are looking at the low-
entropy prefix, the standard deviation is as low as pre-
dicted in earlier sections. Long after we have entered the
high-entropy suffix, the standard deviation progressively
approaches its asymptote 16.29/N—a very low value.
The new effect here is that the standard deviation jumps
to higher values just after we have switched from one
field to the next.
This might be detrimental to the quality of the esti-
mation. However, notice that the top of the bump, for
each value of N1, always remains below the log e/
*
N
line. Remember that, in non-degenerate cases (i.e., when
"2N > 0), the expectation of (ĤMLEN !H)2 is "(1/N)
(Section 4.2), i.e., that, up to a 1/ ln 2 factor to make up
for our use of base-2 logarithms, the standard deviation
in non-degenerate cases is of the order "(1/
*
N). Re-
member also that the steady-state behavior, i.e., on long
fields with the same source entropy, is degenerate.
In other words, the standard deviation is low
("(1/N)) on long enough sequence of bytes with the
same entropy, and goes up to about "(1/
*
N) when we
switch from one field to another with different source en-
tropy.
This is bad news in a sense, because one consequence
is that confidence intervals will necessarily be larger than
in the simple cases studied before Section 6. But ob-
serve that the actual bit values are low anyway. On Fig-
ure 15, the standard deviation never exceeds 0.15 bits
globally (as in previous experiments), and the standard
deviation at the highest point in the bump after N1 is
0.046 bit (reached after 352 bytes, when N1 = 256),
resp. 0.024 bit (reached after 1 280 bytes, when N1 =
1 024), resp. 0.0116 bit (reached after 5 120 bytes, when
N1 = 4 096), resp. 0.0056 bit (reached after 20 480
bytes, when N1 = 16 384). Remember that 99.9% per-
centiles were at about 3.5 times the standard deviation
around the average. This corresponds to 99.9% confi-
dence intervals of ±0.161, resp. ±0.084, resp. ±0.041,





























Figure 15: Standard Deviation (Base64 + Random)
We conducted a similar experiment when the low-
entropy prefix (the first N1 bytes) was not a random
Base64 file, but rather the first N1 bytes of a given text—
namely the TEX source of the paper [27]. The results are
shown in Figure 16 and Figure 17. While the curves are
slightly different, we are forced to reach the same con-
clusions: going from one field to the next forces a sharp
jump in the sample entropy, and grows small bumps into
the standard deviation curve.
In other words, to detect abnormal values of the sam-
ple entropy, confidence intervals should not be an issue.
But the expected shapes of entropy curves should show
some sharp jumps at some specific positions in the in-
coming flow. These positions are not entirely known.
However, we can classify areas in the plane where the
sample entropy is representative of normal behavior. For
example, Figure 18 shows 5 398 valid connections, plus
one attack, which were observed from real traffic at LSV.
Every valid connection falls into a series of rectangu-
lar areas. Note that valid connections produce varying

























































Figure 17: Standard Deviation (Text + Random)
mentation of the protocol. They can all be classified
by the displayed sequence of rectangles. Observe also
that the unique attack shown here exhibits a sharp differ-
ence from the curves, and exits the rectangular areas fast.
We only represent the sample entropy of the whole con-
nection, but measured on a per-packet basis. The attack
curve exits after the 6th packet (1 939 cumulated bytes),






















Figure 18: SSH Normal Behavior, and an Attack
7 Implementation in the Net-Entropy Sen-
sor
Net-entropy is a user program (not a kernel module)
written in C. We use the pcap library [32] to implement
low-level network frame capture, and the LibNIDS li-
brary [35, 36] to implement IP defragmentation and TCP
stream reassembly. The latter library is a user-land port
of the Linux TCP/IP stack (kernel 2.0.36).
While this seems simple enough, there is a catch. We
have observed that, in certain situations, LibNIDS incor-
rectly classified sniffed packets as invalid. This is not a
problem with LibNIDS. Instead, this is a side-effect of
modern implementations of TCP/IP stacks. E.g., kernels
will not compute packet checksums on machines with re-
cent network interface cards, which implement hardware
acceleration feature (TCP segmentation offload, hard-
ware Rx/Tx checksumming). In other words, the kernel
relies on the network interface card to compute check-
sums in hardware, and just sets these checksums to zero.
But then, any sensor that captures network flow while
running on one peer of the connection will get packets
from the local loop, i.e., with zero checksums, and these
will appear to be invalid. This is totally inconsequential
if Net-entropy runs on a router, which is the intended
application, since the router is never one of the peers. In
case Net-entropy were to be used directly on a work-
station, we would need to get around this, typically by
adding a special case to the LibNIDS checksum verifica-






# Range: start end min_ent max_ent
Range: 1 63 0 4.38105154
Range: 64 127 4.22877741 4.64838314
Range: 128 255 4.95194340 5.02499151
Range: 256 511 4.86894369 7.28671360
Range: 512 1023 4.86310673 7.59574795
Range: 1024 1535 4.94409609 7.74570751
Range: 1536 2047 5.77497149 7.81915951
Range: 2048 3071 6.44314718 7.85139179
Range: 3072 4095 7.17234325 7.92034960
Range: 4096 8191 7.46498394 7.96606302
Range: 8192 65536 7.82608652 7.99687433
Figure 19: An example range file, for SSH (port 22)
from the local host.
The Net-entropy sensor keeps track of all connections
of configured protocols and emits an alarm via the Unix
Syslog system when sample entropy is out of specified
bounds. Net-Entropy was designed to run on routers or
intrusion detection hosts, by passively sniffing the net-
work.
For performance reasons, Net-entropy limits the anal-
ysis to the first 64 Kb of data in network connections. We
also drop connection monitoring after some predefined
timeout. Indeed, it may happen that the sensor misses
the termination of the connection, for example in cases
of network or CPU overload. It is also well-known that
limiting monitoring processes is good practice. In par-
ticular, this avoids attacks where the malicious attacker
starts many simultaneous connections, e.g., testing for
passwords, without terminating them properly (with a
TCP FIN or RST packet). A timeout is used to get rid
of these dead connections. This timeout is set by de-
fault to 15 minutes (900 seconds). Every connection that
has remained inactive for this long will be removed from
monitoring. This behavior makes Net-entropy more re-
sistant to denial-of-service and brute force attacks (SYN
flood, SSH scan).
Let us recall that we want to check key exchanges, not
user activity. It is extremely unlikely that a key exchange
take any longer than a few seconds, even on low band-
width networks. Note that a delayed key exchange is
abnormal, whatever its entropy.
7.1 Configuring Net-Entropy
As already hinted at the end of Section 6.3, Net-entropy
checks the sample entropy of monitored connections
on specified ranges. Configuring these ranges is done
through protocol-specific range files. Figure 19 shows
an example of a range file, for the SSH protocol (port
22).
Looking directly at the Range: lines, one observes
that ranges are specified as rectangular areas. E.g., the
first row states that, for SSH connections, the sample en-
tropy between the first byte and byte number 63 should
be between 0 and 4.38105154. Size ranges, e.g., from
byte 1 to byte 63, are specified here in byte units, but
can also be specified on a per-packet basis, by replac-
ing the bytes keyword in the RangeUnit: line by
packets.
It would be a hassle if the user of Net-entropy had
to include all these information by hand. Instead, we
provide a supervised learning mode where the user only
specifies size ranges, and Net-entropy fills out the least
and highest entropy values, from either a live network
capture or from a libpcap capture file.
Each range file contains a definition for one protocol
exactly. As the example above shows, we identify pro-
tocols by their server ports, at the TCP destination. For-
mally, a range file consists of a list of dirlist directives,
obeying the following grammar:
dirlist: dirlist directive | directive
yesno: “yes” | “no”
direction: “cli2srv” | “srv2cli” | “both”





| “Range:” INT INT FLOAT FLOAT
where INT stands for a positive integer (included in
[1,+#)) and FLOAT for a rational number (included in
[0, 8]). Empty lines and lines beginning with a ‘#’ are
silently ignored.
A range file must contain a port number and at least
one range. The Direction directive allows one to
choose which data to analyze, depending on the direc-
tion of the TCP flow. Possible directions are cli2srv
for analyzing only data from client to server, srv2cli
for server to client only and both for all data. The de-
fault value is both, in case this directive is omitted.
The default value of the Cumulative directive is
yes, meaning that statistical entropy will be computed
on a per-connection basis, periodically checking whether
it is in the indicated valid ranges. If the Cumulative
directive is set to no, statistical entropy will be computed
for each packet separately, restarting from zero at each
packet boundary.
As we said earlier, the RangeUnit: directive the
unit in which size ranges are measured. It is either
packets or bytes (default).
The Range: directive allows one to define a new
range. It takes four parameters. The first two denote
the size range, the other two are the least and highest al-
lowed entropies for this range. Net-entropy does a few
consistency checks, e.g., that entropies are between 0 and
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8, that the highest entropy for a range n1–n2 is at most
log n2, that size ranges do not overlap, and are sorted in
increasing order.
Entropy fields can be left empty, by writing an IEEE
754 NaN (Not a Number) in the corresponding field.
This is taken as an indication by the supervised learn-
ing mode that the range file should be updated. Using
the -l option to Net-entropy will then modify the range
file and fill out the required entropy fields. Additionally,
using Net-entropy with the -l option will replace en-
tropy alerts by mere update messages.
To avoid congestion, the range file is only updated
once a connection is terminated for which some entropy
bound has to be modified. In particular, this means that
training Net-entropy through an interactive SSH session
won’t change the range file, until the user quits the ses-
sion.
As is customary in every anomaly detection technique,
it is important to trust the learning set, otherwise the pro-
tocol ranges will be wrong or biased. Tools such as Ethe-
real [4] allow one to select packets from network cap-
ture files very precisely, and to edit captures so as to re-
move offending outliers before sending the training data
to Net-entropy with options -l, and -r (offline cap-
ture).
The command line options of Net-Entropy are sum-
marized in the following table:
Parameter Arg Default value
Interface -i <if> First interface
Off-line file -r <file> No file
Packet capture filter -f <filter> No filter
Runtime user -u <user> root
Memory limit -m <lim> No limit
Connection data size limit -t <lim> 65536 bytes
Connection timeout -T <timeout> 900 seconds
Rule file -P <file> No rule
Learning mode -l Disabled
Erase old range file -d Disabled
Change config file -c net-entropy
.conf
Statistics files -s <dir> No statistics
Flush statistics -F Disabled
Per-byte statistics -b Per packet
Net-entropy is also configured through the use of
a system-wide configuration file, organized as a list
paramlist of parameters. The configuration file format
is defined by the following grammar:








where INT stands for a positive integer and STRING for
a character string. The Interface parameter, as well
as the -i option, allows one to choose the network in-
terface used for the capture. If this parameter is omit-
ted, the first available network interface reported by the
operating system is used. The PcapFilter param-
eter (-f option) is the filter used by the pcap library.
The RuntimeUser parameter (-r) sets the user ac-
count name which will be used for dropping root priv-
ileges, e.g. the pcap or nobody users, or a dedicated
system account. (Net-entropy is meant to start up as
root, if only to allow network capture to function prop-
erly.) The MemoryLimit parameter (-m) sets the maxi-
mum memory limit that the Net-entropy sensor can use.
This limit is a security against denial of service (DoS)
attacks. The MaxTrackSize parameter (-t) sets the
number of bytes after which a connection will cease to
be monitored. The ConnectionTimeout parameter
(-T) is the delay after which connections will be as-
sumed to be inactive, and their monitoring will cease.
The ProtoSpec parameter (-P) adds range files for ad-
ditional protocols to be monitored.
The performance of the Net-entropy sensor can be
significantly enhanced when BSD Packet Filters [15] are
used in the libpcap. The point is that protocols which we
are not interested in will simply be ignored at the ker-
nel level. For example, it is meaningful to monitor SSH
connections coming from outside a local area network
(LAN), so as to detect intrusions on the LAN. It is less in-
teresting to monitor outgoing SSH connections. Another
case where BSD packet filters are useful is when Net-
entropy is deployed on a router for some LAN, but we
know that only a few machines on the LAN implement
a given protocol (e.g., https will only run on secured
servers on the LAN). In this case, BSD packet filters can
be used to focus on packets on given ports and given ad-
dresses or sub-networks. This can be done with a filter
of the form:
(dst net LAN and
(dst port port1 or ... or dst port portn)) or
(src net LAN and
(src port port1 or ... or src port portn))
where LAN is the address of the network to protect, and
portn are TCP ports of protocols to protect. This ba-
sic filter template works on a common network. More
complex filters should be used depending of the network
structure to protect.
7.2 Net-Entropy Alert Messages
Net-entropy emits different kinds of alerts. We illustrate
this on Figure 20, which exhibits a fictitious connection
that generates all kinds of alerts. Alerts can be emitted
during a connection:
• Entropy alarm start: entropy is below the mini-































Figure 20: Net-Entropy alert messages
size range.
• Entropy alarm stop: after an entropy alarm start,
entropy is within bounds again.
• Out of size range: no size range corresponds to
connection data. This means that the range file has
gaps. This may be intentional, then the out of range
alert signals that a given connection has an unex-
pected size: this is then an actual alert.
• Reenter size range: after an out of size range alert,
connection size is back to some value inside some
size range.
Some other alerts are emitted when a connection ceases
to be monitored, either because it is terminated, or be-
cause some size limit or some timeout was reached. This
can only happen if at least one alert was emitted during
the connection.
• End of connection: the TCP connection has ended.
The reason of the disconnection is given: ‘connec-
tion closed’ means that one of the peers has closed
the connection normally, using a TCP FIN packet,
while ‘connection reset’ signals that the connection
was terminated forcefully, with an RST packet.
• Maximum data size reached: the connection data
size limit was exceeded.
• Connection timed out: the connection was inactive
for a duration larger than the allowed timeout.
7.3 Attack Examples
Let us demonstrate two attacks. This will illustrate how
Net-entropy detects them. The two attacks we have cho-
sen are well-known and have been frequently used by
hackers. The first one is the mod_ssl attack [16]. This
attack example has been made with a vulnerable server
running a Linux RedHat 7.3 operating system, Apache
1.3.23 web server, mod ssl 2.8.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.6b
(the three later software are the version bundled with the
RedHat distribution). This exploits a bug in the SSL
module of the Apache web server. On Figure 21, we
draw valid https connections that have been learned
by Net-entropy as green dots. The light green zone cor-
responds to valid ranges. The red curve corresponds to a
run of the mod_ssl attack. The grey curve in the back-
ground is the theoretical average entropy ĤMLEN . With
this set of valid connections, the attack is detected at the
second packet, but is still very close to normal packets at
this point. The third and next upcoming packets are far-
ther and farther from normal behavior. At the end of the
mod_ssl attack, the connection entropy is 5.7 bits per





















Figure 21: Net-Entropy Limits with mod ssl Attack
The second demonstration attack [39] exploits a bug
in SSH servers. The SSH1 CRC32 attack has also com-
monly been used by hackers. This attack example has
been tested on the same computer of the previous at-
tack: a Linux Redhat 7.3 with SSH 1.2.20 secure shell
server. With the configuration shown in light green in
Figure 18, this attack is detected at the 6th packet (1 939
bytes seen). The first 5 packets are similar to normal
connection packets for SSH1 with password-based au-
thentication.
7.4 Benchmarks
Net-Entropy was tested for a duration of one month on
a test network, without any malicious network traffic,
and for a duration of six months on a front router of
the local area network of the Laboratoire Spécification
Vérification laboratory.
The computers used for tests were based on Pentium 4
processors running at 2.4 GHz, with 1 Gb of RAM and 4
100 Mbps Ethernet interfaces.
On the test network, a normal SSH connection and a
normal SSL connection were started every 6 minutes. At
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this rate, 480 connections were started each hour, 11 520
each day, 345 600 connections for the 30 days of the
test. This was meant to reflect a realistic activity rate in a
purely attack-free scenario. Under these conditions, Net-
entropy only uses 4.5 Mb of RAM and 33.90 seconds
of CPU time over the whole month. The average CPU
usage is very low: 0.0013%. The CPU time requirement
is in the order of seconds per month.
On the other hand, and as should be expected, the real
network is more hostile: more undesirable traffic is seen.
In six months, we have seen a total of 563 964 crypto-
graphic network connections, broken down as 511 164
ssh connections, 39 970 https connections, 8 411
pop3s connections, and 4 419 imaps connections.
Among the 511 164 ssh connections, only 32 135
were valid connections—only 6.3% of all ssh traffic.
The other 479 029 were the result of about 135 scans.
Other scans, typically high-speed scans, were automati-
cally blocked by other utilities running on routers at the
provider’s site, and were not taken into account in the ex-
periment. Under these conditions, Net-entropy used 58
minutes and 23 seconds and 16.8 Mb of memory over the
6 month period. The average CPU usage was 0.022%.
This increase in CPU usage, compared to the test net-
work, is due to the fact that scanning packets exhibit
burst traffic. This entails that more parallel connections
must be reassembled by the LibNIDS library. Still, we
observe that CPU and memory usage remain low.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how to implement the
simple idea of sample entropy checking to detect sub-
verted cryptographic flows. As we have argued in the
introduction, this has practical import: the OpenSSL
[16] and SSH CRC32 [39] exploits are examples of this
kind of attack, where traffic that should be encrypted
just isn’t. Our technique also adapts to detecting traf-
fic that looks scrambled but shouldn’t (e.g., polymorphic
viruses). Such attacks are hard to detect by conventional
techniques, which rely on virus signatures for example.
We have shown that, in the simple case of one data field
that should be random-looking, sample entropy was a
remarkably precise estimator of randomness. We have
also described how computing entropy profiles could be
adapted in more complex, realistic situations. Practical
experiments show that this technique is also extremely
efficient; remember that over a six-month period in a
real network environment, the average CPU usage was
0.022%.
Net-Entropy is currently a userland process. A ker-
nel version would be in order—but the lack of generic
hardware support for floating-point operations in current
Linux kernels makes this harder than expected. Another
profitable extension would be for Net-Entropy to be able
to monitor traffic at the IP level, and to include support
for IPv6, IPSec and ESP; LibNIDS currently only allows
us to plug Net-Entropy onto TCP/IPv4 traffic—which
already accounts for a good deal of connections. It would
also be sensible to use Net-Entropy as a firewall mod-
ule: the sensor could directly execute firewall actions,
like logging, rejecting or redirecting.
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10 Availability
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A Deriving the Paninski Formula
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is the multinomial coefficient.
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On the other hand, recall that binomial distributions
can be approximated by Poisson distributions. When
N " +# and p" 0 with pN $ ',
N !
n!(N ! n)!p




This can be derived from Stirling’s formula and elemen-
tary calculation.
For convenience, we shall use the hat notation
n0, . . . , n̂i, . . . , nm!1 to denote the list n0, . . . , nm!1
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without the entry numbered i. Also, n0 + . . . + n̂i +
. . . + nm!1 denotes the sum of n0, . . . , n̂i, . . . , nm!1,
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by using the multinomial expansion formula. Since
moreover !ni log ni is 0 when ni equals 0, we may sum
over ni from 1 to N , hence HN (p) equals











Assume N " +#, m " +#, and for each i, 0 ' i '
m!1, pi " 0 with piN $ 'i; in particular,
∑m!1
i=0 'i $
N . Then by (4),
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In the particular case where p is the uniform distribu-
tion U , N,m" +# and N/m $ c, then pi = 1/m and
'i = c for every i, so












and we conclude since log m is the value H(U) of the
source entropy.
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